上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理与审计意见关系研究(硕士)(论文26000字)
摘 要
高管薪酬激励是现代企业解决代理问题、促进企业发展的重要机制,也是实务界和理论界一直关注的热点。科学、合理的薪酬契约体制能有效调动高管积极性和主动性，使得人尽其才，公司利益与个人利益趋向一致，实现双赢的局面。但同时也产生了高管为个人利益最大化而操纵公司盈余的现象，由此高管薪酬与盈余管理成为实务界和理论界倍受关注的热点。在我国，上市公司进行盈余管理的现象越来越普遍,而注册会计师审计是对上市公司盈余管理行为的重要监督力量。本文以2011年至2013年年报被出具非标准审计意见的A股上市公司为研究样本，运用Logistic回归分析法，研究高管薪酬、盈余管理与审计意见三者之间的关系。本文创新点在于研究视角的创新和研究方法的选取：以往研究大多只单独研究高管薪酬或盈余管理与审计意见之间的关系，而本文同时研究高管薪酬、盈余管理对审计意见的影响；本文创新性地将高管薪酬的概念包括了高管短期薪酬、高管长期薪酬以及高管隐性收入，更加全面地研究高管薪酬激励对于高管行为的影响，同时，将非经常性损益比净利润和可控应计利润同时作为盈余管理的度量指标，选取不同的模型对可控应计利润进行计量，用于稳健性检验，使结论更具说服力。最终得出结论：我国上市公司的高管薪酬与非标准审计意见显著负相关，说明了上市公司高管激励的有效性；以可控应计利润衡量的盈余管理程度与非标审计意见显著正相关，说明我国注册会计师在某种程度上可以识别上市公司的盈余管理行为。
关键词：高管薪酬，盈余管理，可控应计利润，非标准审计意见
ABSTRACT
Executive compensation incentive is an important mechanism of modern enterprises to solve the problem of agency, moreover, to facilitate the development of the enterprise. It is also the hot spot that has been concerned among the practitioners and theorists . Scientific and reasonable compensation contract system can effectively mobilize executive’s enthusiasm and initiative, make the company interests and personal interests tend to be consistent, then, a win-win situation could be formed. However, it has also lead to a phenomenon that some executives manipulate the company earnings to maximize personal benefits. Thus,the management of executive compensation and earnings turned into a hot issue. In our country, it becomes increasingly common for listed companies to manage the earnings and CPA audit is an important supervisory power against this behavior. In this paper, the samples are A-share listed companies which the 2011-2013 Annual Report had been given non-standard audit opinions. Meanwhile, the paper use Logistic Regression analysis and Multiple Linear Regression to study the relationship among executive compensation,earnings management and audit opinions.The innovation of this paper lies in the selection of research perspectives and methods: most previous research only made a separate study of the connection between executive compensation or earnings management and auditing opinions.Still, this paper focused on the effect of executive pay and earnings management on audit opinions at the same time. In this paper, the concept of the executive pay innovative includes short term executive compensation, long term executive compensation and executive recessive income, which makes a more comprehensive study of how executive compensation incentive effect executive behavior. Meantime, in order to make the conclusion more convinced,non-recurring loss ratio net profit and controllable accrued profit was considered as criterion of earnings management , and different model was selected to measure controllable accrued profit , which was for robustness test. Finally concluded the followings: executive compensation and non-standard audit opinions shows a significant negative correlation, which indicated that executive compensation has positive effect on listed companies. On the contrary, the connection between earnings management and non-standard audit opinions appears to be a positive correlation, which means that CPA can tell earnings management of listed companies in some degree.
Keywords: executive compensation; earnings management; discretionary accruals; non-standard audit opinion
目录
学位论文原创性声明 1
学位论文版权使用授权书 2
摘 要 1
ABSTRACT 2
第一章 绪论 1
1.1 研究背景与意义 1
1.2 国内外文献综述 2
1.3 研究内容与方法 5
1.3.1 研究内容 5
1.3.2 研究方法 5
1.3.3 研究思路 5
1.4 创新点 6
1.4.1 研究视角 6
1.4.2 研究方法 6
1.5 论文的基本框架 7
第二章 概念界定与理论分析 8
2.1 概念界定 8
2.1.3 审计意见 9
2.2 理论分析与假设 10
2.2.1 理论基础 10
2.2.2 理论分析与假设 11
第三章 研究设计 13
3.1 变量设定 13
3.2 模型设定 16
3.3 样本选取及数据来源 20
第四章 实证分析 21
4.1 描述性分析 21
4.1.1 2013年指标描述性分析 21
4.1.2 2012年指标描述性分析 24
4.1.3 2011年指标描述性分析 26
4.2 实证分析 27
4.2.1 指标显著性检验 27
4.2.3 稳健性检验 38
4.4 小结 39
第五章 问题及建议 40
5.1 发现的问题 40
5.2 原因分析 40
5.3 相关建议 41
第六章 研究结论和局限 42
6.1 研究结论 42
6.2研究局限 42
参考文献 44
致谢 46 |
