股权质押、外部治理环境与公司绩效的实证研究(硕士)(论文24000字)
摘要
随着我国的资本市场发展，可供选择的融资工具也与日俱增，逐渐丰富。这其中，股权质押作为一种起步较晚的融资方式，近些年来数量和规模均突飞猛击。根据Wind的数据统计，2017年全年，A股上市公司共发生股票质押或者补充质押事件13179起，涉及到的上市公司数量多达1979家，占全部A股上市公司的57.08%。其中，涉及到控股股东的出质行为多达1597家，也即有46.06%的上市公司控股股东在当年通过场内或者场外股票质押的方式进行融资，这一融资工具俨然成为了资本市场资金融通的有力补充。
但是，控股股东的股票出质行为也可能会带来不利影响。一方面，质押行为均会面临被迫平仓的风险。在2018年2月初的股灾中，短短一周时间内就有254家上市公司发布322份补充质押公告，截至2月10日就有25家企业的股东宣布存在平仓风险。另一方面，控股股东虽将其股票出质，但其可以行使表决权比例仍然包含出质的部分。这种潜在的被动减持和不受影响的表决权加剧了控制权和现金收益权的分离，从而导致控股股东的利益侵占动机提高，影响公司的经营效益。
更进一步，既然股权质押是强化了大股东的侵占动机，从而拖累了公司绩效，那么是否能够提高外部治理环境水平来抑制大股东的违法动机，进而增厚公司经营效益呢？而王小鲁（2017）等人的研究表明，我国不同省份地区间的法律制度环境水平存在着较大差异，这为本文的研究提供了天然的实验场所。
本文以2013年至2015年期间存在控股股东股权质押行为的A股上市公司研究对象，探索大股东的股票出质行为可能会对公司绩效产生的影响。在此基础之上，本文在模型中添加了质押比例与外部治理环境水平的交叉项，来研究外部治理环境在股权质押状态下是否发挥了正面的激励作用。
本文的研究结论包括：（1）是否存在控股股东的股权质押影响了上市公司的资金占用程度，股权质押加剧了两权分离从而导致利益侵占效应显著；（2）外部治理环境的提高，能够有效抑制股权质押带来的侵占动机，使得资金占用程度下降；（3）公司经营效益和质押比例显著负相关，质押比例越高，总资产报酬率越低；而外部治理水平的提高有利于改善股票质押对公司经营绩效的负面效应。
关键词：股权质押；外部治理环境；利益侵占；公司绩效
Abstract
As China's capital markets develop, alternative financing tools are also growing and gradually enriched. Among them, the stock pledge is a rising star, whose number and size both make a rapid progress in recent years. According to Wind's statistics, a total of 13,179 stock pledges or supplementary pledges occurred in A-share listed companies during the year of 2017, involving as many as 1979 listed public companies, accounting for 57.08% of all A-share listed companies. Among them, as many as 1597 pledges are conducted by controlling shareholders, that is, 46.06% of the controlling shareholders of listed companies raised funds in the year of 2017 by way of pledges inside or outside the stock market. This financing tool has become a powerful supplement.
However, controlling shareholders' stock pledging may also have an adverse effect. On the one hand, pledges are at risk of forced liquidation. In the stock market crash in early February 2018, 254 listed companies issued 322 supplementary pledges in just a week. As of February 10, shareholders of 25 companies announced the risk of liquidation. On the other hand, although the controlling shareholder has pledged his shares, the proportion of voting rights that he / she can exercise still contains the portion of the pledged shares. This potential passive reduction of his / her stock shares and unaffected voting rights aggravate the separation of control and cash return rights, resulting in a higher motivation for controlling shareholders' encroachment on interests and affecting the operating efficiency of the company.
Furthermore, since the pledge of equity is to strengthen the motivation of the major shareholders to encroach upon, which will drag down the performance of the company, can we raise the level of external governance to curb the illegal motive of the controlling shareholders and further increase the operating efficiency of the company? Moreover, the research by Wang Xiaolu et al. (2017) shows that there is a big difference in the legal environment between different provinces in our country, which provides a natural experimental site for the study of this article.
In this paper, the research object is A-share listed companies with controlling shareholder's equity pledged between 2013 and 2015, use this sample to explore the impact of the stock pledge of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. On this basis, this paper adds the cross terms between the pledge ratio and the external governance environment level in the model to study whether the external governance environment plays a positive stimulating role in the state of equity pledge.
The conclusions of this paper include: (1) whether the existence of the pledge of controlling shareholder's stock shares affects the encroachment on the listed company, and the pledge of equity aggravates the separation of the two rights, which leads to significant effect of the benefit encroachment; (2) the improvement of external governance environment level can be effective (3) There is a significant negative correlation between the operating efficiency of the company and the pledge ratio, the higher the pledge ratio, the lower the return on total assets; and the improvement of the level of external governance is conducive to improve the negative effect on the company performance which the pledge brings to.
Key word：stock pledge; external governance; encroachment; company performance;
目录
摘要 I
Abstract II
第一章 绪论 1
第一节 研究背景与研究意义 1
一、研究背景 1
二、研究意义 2
第二节 研究思路与框架结构 2
第三节 研究方法与创新 3
第二章 文献综述 4
第一节 股票质押与利益侵占、公司绩效 4
第二节 外部治理环境与利益侵占、公司绩效 5
第三章 理论分析与假设 7
第一节 股权质押制度 7
一、股权质押简介 7
二、股权质押的要素 7
三、股权质押受限的情况 8
第二节 控股股东股票质押的原因 10
一、融资需求 10
二、减持动机 11
三、侵占上市公司利益 11
第三节 股权质押与公司绩效 12
一、两权分离理论 12
二、信息不对称理论 14
第四节 外部治理环境与公司绩效 15
一、外部治理环境内涵 15
二、外部治理环境、股权质押与公司绩效 16
第五节 研究假设 16
第四章 研究设计 17
第一节 样本选择与数据来源 17
一、样本选择 17
二、数据来源 17
第二节 模型构建 18
一、模型设计 18
二、变量定义 18
第五章 实证分析 22
第一节 股权质押、外部治理环境与利益侵占的实证分析 22
一、描述性统计 22
二、分组单变量检验 24
三、实证回归与分析 25
第二节 股权质押、外部治理环境与公司绩效的实证研究 28
一、描述性统计 28
二、实证回归与分析 29
第六章 研究结论与展望 33
第一节 本文研究结论 33
第二节 本文的展望 33
参考文献 35 |
